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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of the formation of the 
Common Market on changes in seller concentration and price-cost 
margins in the member states. Using NACE 3-digit industry data 
for West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 
the paper first seeks to identify the effect of the removal of 
intra-EC tariffs on changes in national concentration. The 
paper then tests the hypothesis that concentration measured at 
the EC-wide level is becoming a relevant structural variable 
which affects the national price-cost margin. 
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I. Introduction 
The removal of tariffs and, quantitative restrictions on 
trade which created a common market known as the European 
Economic Community (EEC) 1 provides researchers a great 
opportunity for studying its effects on economic variables. One 
research area which has been most intensively analyzed so far 
is the effects of the formation of the Common Market on 
international trade flows. Attempts to estimate trade creation 
and trade diversion abound and have found that in the Common 
Market trade creation exceeded trade diversion. 2 Also it has 
been observed that the creation of the Common Market caused an 
increase in intraindustry trade among the Common Market 
t . 3 coun r~es. 
However, surprisingly little attention has been paid on the 
effects of the Common Market's formation on market structure 
and competitive performance in the member countries. The 
liberalization of trade among the EC countries leads to a 
number of interesting hypotheses concerning the dynamic 
adjustments of market structure and performance. One of the 
important hypotheses on the effect of the Common Market's 
formation on mqrket structure is that the elimination of 
tariffs and other restrictions on trade increased the 
industry's exposure to trade and thus led to rationalization of 
inefficient~size plants which had not exploited scale economies 
in the national market. 4 Correspondingly, seller concentration 
in the national market should have been changed after the 
formation of the Common Market. 
Another interesting hypothesis, which relates the formation 
of the Common Market to changes in market behavior and 
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performance, is that domestic sellers in a member country may 
start to recognize interdependence with foreign sellers in 
another member country and engage in an oligopoly game after 
the formation of the EC as they now meet and compete with each 
other in the Common Market. To the extent that this is the 
case, market perfomance of each community member would be 
affected by the state of community-wide competition which may 
be represented by seller concentration on a community-wide 
basis. A measure of EC-wide concentration, which is supposed to 
capture the effect of the enlarged market, has been proposed 
and estimated by Yamawaki, Weiss, and Sleuwaegen (1987). 
The purpose of the paper is therefore twofold: 
First, we examine the effects of the massive elimination of 
tariffs effected by the EC on changes in seller concentration 
for each member of the Common Marketf and secondly, we test the 
hypothesis that EC-wide concentration will be a significant 
element of market structure which affects the member country's 
price-cost margin in industries where the integration of 
markets is more complete. Thus, in Section II we report the 
statistical results of the determinants of changes in seller 
concentration. After we briefly explained the method to 
estimate a measure of EC-wide concentration, we report in 
Section III the regression results which explain changes in 
price-cost margins by EC-wide concentration. Finally, Section 
IV concludes the paper. 
1 
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II. The Formation of the Common Market and Changing Industrial 
Concentration in the Member States 
It is a well-documented fact that the liberalization of 
trade among the member states of the European Community (EC) 
which created a customs union has greatly increased intra-
Community trade. The increase in intra-EC trade in 
manufacturing has been caused mainly by trade creation (the 
displacement of domestic production of imported goods by 
imports from more competitive EC countries) and not by trade 
diversion (the replacement of imports from a low cost extra-EC 
source by imports from a less efficient intra-EC source). 
Furthermore, this has been reinforced by a rising importance of 
intra-industry trade and a substantial improvement in the 
efficiency of European industries relative to the counterparts 
in the rest of the world (Balassa, 1975). 
II-1. A Hypothesis 
One hypothesis which emerges from this observation is that 
the increasing trade exposure after the removal of tariffs and 
other restrictions of trade within the EC gave rise to 
adjustments of the structure of industries in the member states 
of the Common Market. It should be noted, however, that the 
increasing extra-EC trade exposure effected by the different 
GATT rounds which took place in the same periods may have 
caused similar adjustments in market structures (see Jacquemin 
and Sapir, 1988). 
The effects of the elimination of tariffs and increased 
trade exposure on changes in industrial concentration are 
difficult to formulate a priori in the framework of a formal 
theoretical model. Instead, we start our analysis by asking an 
empirical question whether the enlargement of market sizes 
through the removal of intra-Community tariffs has led to 
competitive displacement of inefficient-scale producers by a 
producer who builds an efficient-scale plant and seeks to 
exhaust available economies of scale. Correspondingly, seller 
concentration in the national market should be increased after 
the elimination of intra-Community tariffs. (Scitovsky, 1958; 
Owen, 1983: and Caves, 1985). The assumption underlying this 
hypothesis is that in the pre-EC period market behavior in the 
national market is that of a collusive oligopoly, and the 
national oligopolists discourage themselves from expanding 
their production capacities. When tariff barriers are 
eliminated and more effecient foreign producers try to sell 
their goods at more competitive prices within the Common 
Market, the domestic oligopolists respond by expanding their 
capacities and trying to exploit available scale economies. 
With the price depressed, inefficient-scale domestic producers 
will be forced to exit in the adjustment process (Caves, 1985). 
II-2. Statistical Analysis 
Variables and Data 
Using a statistical model, we test the hypothesis that the 
elimination of intra-EC tariffs has increased seller 
concentration in the national market of the member states. 
Thus, our main concern is to examine the effect of changes in 
tariffs on changes in national concentration. The removal of 
tariffs within the EC is interpreted in our analysis as the 
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change of tariffs from the pre-EC level to the post-EC level 
which is zero. 
Our research design and the choice of observation period 
were mainly governed by the scarcity of data, especially seller. 
concentration. Since seller concentration at a disaggregated 
industry level which is comparable among the original members 
of the EC is not easily obtainable from published sources, we 
estimated them from the first EC Census which was published for 
1963 and the unpublished data for 1978 which were made 
available to us by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities. Correspondingly, all other variables except the 
tariff variable in the statistical analysis are constructed 
around these two years and expressed in a change form. Although 
it was dictated by data limitations, the choice of 1963 as the 
beginning year of the observation period is not satisfactory 
since the tariff reduction process in the EC started in 1959. 
However, given the facts that 1963 was in the middle of the 
tariff reduction process which ended in 1968, 5 and market 
structure tends to change rather slowly, 6 it may not be 
particularly unreasonable to represent the pre-EC market 
structure by the market structure in 1963 and assume that they 
belonged to the same regime. 
The data for 1963 and 1978 are available at the three-digit 
level of the EC Industrial Classification. 7 We eliminated 56 
industries from the entire sample since some figures for these 
industries are omitted for disclosure reasons. Thus, our sample 
consists of 47 three-digit industries matched among the EC 
countries. 
Our dependent variable is the change in concentration: 
, 
6 
6LNCR4 = LNCR4(78) - LNCR4(63) =Change in the logarithm of 
the four-firm national concentration (LNCR4) 
between 1978 and 1963. 
National concentration (NCR4) was estimated from data on the 
firm size distribution by employment size class for the EC 
countries. The estimation method was originated by Bain (1966) 
and has been employed by Phlips (1971), George and Ward (1975), 
and Owen (1983). 8 The concentration ratio is measured in terms 
of employment instead of sales due to data limitation. 9 
We test our hypothesis on the concentration increasing 
effect of the removal of tariffs by the change in intra-EC 
tariffs: 
6TARIFF = Import duties on goods imported from EC countries 
divided by the value of imports from these 
countries at the first year of the tariff 
elimination process in the EC, 1959. 
Since all the intra-EC tariffs were elimiated by 1968, 6TARIFF 
represents the absolute percentage reduction of intra-EC 
tariffs for each member country. This variable measures the 
direct impact of the intra-EC trade liberalization through the 
formation of a customs union. However, this variable measures 
only the effect of tariffs but not the role of non-tariff 
barriers to trade. Thus, we expect a positive relation between 
6LNCR4 and 6TARIFF, implying that the tariff reduction 
increases concentration. 
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To capture the effect of the Common Market's formation, we 
prefer the use of the tariff variable to the use of changes in 
trade intensity since the trade variables do not distinguish 
the increase in trade flows due to the tariff elimination from 
the increase due to other disturbances and therefore measure 
the effect of the trade liberalization only imperfectly. 
Furthermore, the use of trade intensity variables may suffer 
from an econometric simultaneity problem in so far as they are 
jointly determined with market structure (Lyons, 1987). 
Nevertheless, we include the trade intensity variables to 
control for the observed effects of trade 1iberalization. 10 The 
change in exports is measured by 
6WXS = WXS(78) - WXS(63) =Change in export intensity (WXS) 
between 1978 and 1963. Export intensity is measured 
as the ratio of total exports to total shipments. 
The change in imports is measured by 
6WMS = WMS(78) - WMS(63) =Change in import intensity (WMS) 
between 1978 and 1963. Import intensity is measured 
by the ratio of total imports to apparent domestic 
consumption (total shipments+ imports- exports). 
Besides the change in exports and the change in imports, we 
include a variable which represents changes in the size of 
industry: 
8 
6LEMP = LEMP(78) - LEMP(63) = change in the logarithm of the 
size of industry measured in terms of total 
employment (EMP) between 1978 and 1963. 
In an effort to control for the effect of changes in the 
size of efficient-scale plants on changes in concentration, we 
use 
6LPS = LPS(78) - LPS(66) = Change in the logarithm of 
average plant size (PS) between 1978 and 1966. 
This variable is supposed to represent changes in the 
technological conditions related to scale economies. With the 
size of industry controlled, increases in average plant size 
due to changes in minimum efficient scale will raise 
concentration. 11 
Other variables included in the statistical model are as 
follows : 
LNCR4(63) = the logarithm of the four-firm national 
concentration in 1963. 
CD = Dummy variable equal to one if the industry is 
judged to sell primarily consumer goods. 
Dl = Dummy variable equal to one for industries 
producing petroleum products. 
1 
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D2 = Dummy variable equal to one for industries 
producing ores and metals, non-metallic 
mineral, and chemical products. 
D3 = Dummy variable equal to one for industries 
producing metal products, machinery, electrical 
equipment, and transportation equipment. 
LNCR4(63) is included to provide a control for the initial 
level of concentration since changes in concentration would be 
constrained by the initial level. CD is intended to control for 
product characteristics and designate industries where product 
differentiation based on consumer tastes plays an important 
role. Other three dummy variables, Dl, D2, and D3, also control 
for industry characteristics. Those industries which are not 
represented by these dummies are taken as the reference sector. 
We estimate the following model for five Common Market 
countries, namely West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands: 12 
3 
6LNCR4 = a 0 + i~l ai D(i) + a 4 CD + a 5 6TARIFF 
+ a 6 6WXS + a 7 6WMS + a 8 6LEMP + a 9 6LPS 
+ a 10 LNCR4(63) + ~ ( 1 ) 
where ~ is the disturbance term. Table 1 presents means and 
standard deviations of the variables used in the statistical 
analysis. The table shows that in our sample the magnitude of 
the reduction of intra-EC tariffs for France, 0.22, is the 
largest among the five countries and followed by Italy, 0.19, 
10 
and Belgium, 0.13. The change in concentration is again the 
largest for France, which is again followed by Italy and 
Belgium. Detailed accounts on the data sources are given in the 
appendix. 
Statistical Results 
The OLS result of equation (1) which is estimated separately 
for the five EC countries is presented in Table 2-A to table 
2-F. In table 2, equation 1 shows the result without the tariff 
and trade exposure variables while equations 2 and 3 include 
either of these variables. Equation 4 in table 2 includes the 
tariff and trade variables together. In equations 5 and 6, the 
coefficients for 6WXS and 6WMS are constrained to be equal, 
a 6=a7 , in order to measure total trade exposure or the openness 
of the industry. 
Our main hypothesis on the concentration increasing effect 
of tariff reductions is tested in equations 2 and 4. 6TARIFF 
has a significant and expected positive coefficient in all the 
countries except the Netherlands. For West Germany, France, and 
Belgium, the significant positive effect of 6 TARIFF remains 
unchanged even after 6WXS and 6WMS are included in equation 4. 
Thus, the finding suggests that the elimination of intra-EC 
tariffs have promoted a more concentrated industry structure in 
the EC countries except the Netherlands. This may further imply 
that a strong shake-out of inefficient-scale plants and a 
better exploitation of scale economies in the larger firms have 
been realized after the formation of the Common Market. 13 
The sign of the coefficient for 6 TARIFF in the Netherlands 
is negative but insignificantly different from zero at the 
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10 percent level of significance. It should be noted that the 
Netherlands display the lowest mean reduction of intra-EC 
tariffs, 0.05, with smaller variation across the sample 
industries, 0.02, which make a marked contrast with the French 
figures where the mean is 0.22 with the standard deviation of 
0.08. 
In estimating the effect of the tariff variable, we found 
the estimation results for France to be very sensitive to the 
inclusion of textiles and clothing industries where the pre-EC 
levels of tariffs were quite high. Import duties as a ratio to 
the value of intra-EC imports for the textiles and clothing 
·industries in France are 0.266 and 0.324 respectively, which 
are about 7 times as high as those for the counterparts in the 
Netherlands and more than 2.5 times as high as those for West 
Germany. When industries in the two sectors are excluded from 
the sample, the coefficient for 6TARIFF in France becomes 
highly significant at the 1 percent level with a positive sign 
as seen in equations 2 and 4 in table 2-C, suggesting that 
these two industries are outliers in the sample. This result 
seems to reflect the fact that the concentration increasing 
effect of the massive removal of intra-EC tariffs in the 
textiles and clothing sectors is offset by the imposition of 
quotas which renders the internal customs union ineffective. 
14 (Pelkmans, 1984, pp. 244-245). 
The effects of the trade variables, 6WXS and 6WMS, tend to 
vary from one country to another in unconstrained equations 3 
and 4. To see whether the coefficient on 6WXS is equal to that 
on 6WMS, we estimated the equation with the restriction on 
their coefficients. With the coefficients of the two trade 
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exposure variables constrained to the same value (equations 5 
and 6), the restriction can not be rejected at the 10 percent 
level of significance for all countries except Belgium. In 
equations 5 and 6, the constrained coefficient is negative and 
significant for all five countries, implying that total trade 
exposure decreases domestic concentration. Thus, the more open 
the industry becomes, the less the industry becomes 
concentrated, suggesting that total trade exposure brings about 
a more equal distribution of company sizes in the industry. 
That this concentration decreasing effect of observed trade 
exposures needs to be distinguished from the concentration 
increasing effect of the elimination of tariffs is illustrated 
clearly in equation 6. In this fully specified equation, for 
West Germany, France, and Belgium, the coefficient of the 
change in tariffs remains positive and unaffected by the 
inclusion of the trade intensity variables. 
The rest of the variables in the equation show the effects 
which are consistent across the five EC countries. The change 
in the size of industry, ~LEMP, and the initial level of 
national concentration, LNCR4(63), have significant and 
expected negative effects on changes in concentration for all 
countries, while the change in average plant size, ~LPS, has an 
expected positive sign in all five countries and is significant 
except for Italy. 
In sum, we found, most importantly, that the formation of 
the customs union which was effected by the elimination of 
protective tariffs walls in the EC member states has led to a 
more concentrated industry structure. Furthermore, this 
concentration increasing effect was observed independently from 
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the effects of observed changes in total trade exposure which 
on the contrary decreased national concentration. These two 
effects are not necessarily conflicting with each other, given 
that the effects of increases in total trade exposure or 
increases in both exports and import intensities emphasize the 
effects caused by the increase in intra-industry trade. 
III. The Formation of the Common Market and Changing Market 
Performance in the Member States. 
Having identified the empirical relation between the removal 
of intra-EC tariffs and changes in seller concentration in the 
national market, our next task is to examine the relationship 
between the change in market structure and changes in industry 
profitability. However, that part of task may not be easy one 
since the elimination of tariffs not only have increased 
national concentration but also should have widened the scope 
of competition geographically. Thus, domestic sellers and 
foreign sellers now meet and compete with each other in the 
Common Market. Correspondingly, market performance for each 
community member would be influenced by the state of 
community-wide competition, which would not be captured by 
concentration constructed for the national market. 
III-1. Estimation of EEC-Wide Seller Concentration 
In order to capture the effect of the enlarged market on 
the state of competition, seller concentration on a community-
wide basis was estimated. Since detailed accounts on the method 
of estimation and the estimates of EC-wide concentration are 
provided elsewhere (Yamawaki, Weiss and Sleuwaegen, 1987), our 
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discussion on the construction of EC-wide concentration is 
minimum here. 
The scarcity of data again governed the choice of the 
estimation method and forced us to adopt an indirect approach 
which employs industry statistics of the member countries 
instead of a more direct approach based on largest European 
firms' sales shares in the EC market. The estimation method 
used here is based on information on the scale of operation 
accounted for by the largest firms in each EC country. As in 
the case of national concentration, we used the number of 
employment instead of sales as the unit of measurement. The 
estimation method proceeds as follows: 
(1) First estimate, for each of the EC countries, the number 
of employees in industry controlled by the largest four firms 
(E4 .. where i =industry and j =country). We estimated it 
1] 
based on the method originated by Bain (1966, pp. 26-29) from 
data on the firm size distribution by employment size class for 
the EC countries; 
(2) Rank the member countries' E4s in the descending order 
for each industry. Select the largest E4 for each industry and 
call this variable as MIN E4. This variable is a minimum 
estimate of the number of employment controlled by the largest 
four firms in the Common Market. The assumption behind MIN E4 
is that the largest four firms domiciled in a national market 
whose scale of production jointly exceeds that of the largest 
firms in any other national market are also appointed as the 
largest four firms in the Common Market. 
(3) From the ranking of the member countries' E4s in each 
industry, select the top four and add these four to obtain a 
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maximum estimate of the number of employment controlled by the 
largest four firms in the Common Market. We call this variable 
as MAX E4. It might be based on two alternative assumptions. 
One possibility would be that the four leading firms in each 
country belong to a common group of owners. An alternative 
might be that the leading firm in each of the four countries 
had the largest market share possible given the national 
t t . t. 15 concen ra 1on ra 10; 
(4) To obtain minimum and maximum estimates of four-firm 
concentration in the EC market (MIN EC CR4 and MAX EC CR4, 
respectively), we divide MIN E4 and MAX E4 by total employment 
in the Common Market, thus 
MIN EC CR4 MIN E4 = Total Employment in the Common Market 
and 
MAX EC CR4 MAX E4 ; = Total Employment 1n the Common Market 
and 
(5) EC-wide concentration is finally obtained by averaging 
out the minimum estimate and the maximum estimate of concen-
tration obtained in (4), 
EC CR4 = 1/2 (MIN EC CR4 +MAX EC CR4). 
It is essentially arbitrary to assign the mean of the maximum 
and minimum estimates to EC CR4. It might also introduce bias. 
Common ownership of leaders in all four countries is surely 
16 
rare, but quite a lot of international mergers involving major 
firms did occur in the 1960s and 1970s. To the extent that this 
occurred, our estimates of EC CR4 in 1978 are understated 
relative to the 1963 estimate. Turning to the alternative 
assumption, market dominance is rare in the United States 
(Weiss and Pascoe (1984)) but it is likely to be greater in the 
smaller national markets of Europe. To the extent that the 
Common Market is much more competitive than a national market 
would be with trade barriers, the arbitrary downward adjustment 
that occurs in our procedure is a move in the same direction. 
We estimated EC-wide concentration for 1963 and 1978, the 
only years for which data on the firm size distribution by 
detailed employment size class are available. 16 To make the 
estimate of EC concentration in 1963 comparable to that in 1978 
and to eliminate possible distortions associated with the 
enlargement of the Common Market which occurred after 1973, 
1978 employment of Britain, Denmark, and Ireland is subtracted 
from the denominators of the minimum and maximum estimates of 
1978 EC-wide concentration. 17 Thus the denominators of both 
1963 and 1978 EC-wide concentration are defined as the sum of 
employment in West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
B 1 . 18 e g~um. 
III-2. Hypotheses on EC-Wide Concentration 
Previous investigators of the relationship between 
concentration and industry price-cost margins in the EC 
countries have assumed that domestic sellers do not recognize 
their interdependence with foreign sellers19 and the relevant 
market is at the national level even after the formation of the 
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EC. Our approach instead allows for the possibility that 
European firms recognize their interdependence in the Common 
Market. Based on this line of approach, Yamawaki, Weiss, and 
Sleuwaegen (1987) found some evidence indicating the positive 
influence of EC-wide concentration on the price-cost margin for 
larger EC countries, West Germany, France, and Italy. 
In the present paper, we extend our earlier analysis and 
correct possible biases which we might have incurred by 
treating the coefficient for EC-wide concentration as a 
constant which does not vary across industries. The major 
empirical result reported in Yamawaki, Weiss, and Sleuwaegen 
(1987) was obtained on the assumption that the elimination of 
tariffs within the EC led to a complete integration of national 
marketrs in every industry. However, this assumption may not 
hold in some industries because of the existence of regional 
markets and all sorts of non-tariff barriers to trade. 20 To the 
extent that the customs union in the EC is not truely 
effective, EC-wide concentration would be of relatively less 
importance in determining the national price-cost margin. 
Therefore, we propose a research design which retains the 
information on national concentration treating the change in 
the national price-cost margin as a function of the change in 
its national concentration and the change from national to EC-
wide concentration, weighted by the extent of the integration 
of national markets. In this way, EC-wide concentration is 
treated properly as a measure of market structure only in 
industries where the integration of markets in the EC is 
effective. 
18 
Our hypothesis is, therefore, that EC-wide concentration is 
becoming an important structural variable influencing the 
national price-cost margins in industries where the market is 
not regionally fragmented, and intra-EC trade is significantly 
rising. 21 The theoretical relationship among theories of 
oligopoly, price-cost margins, and measures of concentration 
has been presented in recent literature (see, for example, 
Waterson, 1984), establishing that the price-cost margin is 
related positively to the measure of concentration. 
III-3. Statistical Analysis 
Variables 
Our dependent variable is changes in the price-cost margin 
in the national market. 22 
~PCM = PCM(78)/PCM(63) =Price-cost margins in 1978 divided 
by price-cost margins in 1963. Price-cost margins are 
defined as value added minus payroll divided by value 
of shipments. 
As mentioned above, we use two measures of concentration: 
~NCR4 = NCR4(78) - NCR4(63) =Difference between the four-
firm national concentration ratio (NCR4) in 1978 and 
that in 1963: and 
~ECNCR4 = EC CR4(78) - NCR4(63) =Difference between the four-
firm EC concentration ratio (EC CR4) in 1978 and the 
four-firm national concentration ratio in 1963. 
1 
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6NCR4 measures the change in national concentration, while 
6ECNCR4 measures the change from national concentration to EC-
wide concentration. As shown in table 1, the sample mean for 
6ECNCR4 decreases with the size of national market, reflecting 
the higher level of national concentration in smaller EC 
countries. 
These two measures of changes in concentration are used 
interactively with exogenous variables to test whether the 
effect of changes in concentration varies with the extent of 
market integration within the EC. Certain products which are 
subject to high shipping costs cannot economically be 
transported far from the country of production even after the 
Common Market's formation, and so they are primarily sold in 
regionally fragmented markets. In the existence of local 
markets, concentration measured at the Common Market level will 
understate effective concentration, and concentrati.on measured 
at the national market will provide more accurate state of 
competition. Thus, we introduce 
REGD = Dummy variable equal to one if the market is judged 
to be regionally fragmented in the u.s. counterpart 
. d t 23 1n us ry. 
Since a measure of the extent of market segregation within the 
EC is not easily obtainable, we construct REGD based on the 
experience in the U.S. assuming that if the market is 
regionally fragmented in U.S. industries, the Common Market 
counterparts would also experience similar tendency due to 
common technological characteristics associated with the 
20 
products. We include the two interaction variables in the 
model; 6NCR4 * REGD to represent fragmented markets; and 
6ECNCR4 * (1 - REGD) to represent integrated markets. 
In addition to REGD, we introduce a dummy variable which 
distinguishes industries where intra-EC exports increased 
significantly during the 1963-78 period from those which did 
not: 
LOECXD = Dummy variable equal to one if the change in 
intra-EC export intensity between 1963 and 1978 is 
less than 0.1. Intra-EC export intensity is 
measured as the ratio of total intra-EC exports 
from West Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium to 
total world exports from these countries. 
The sample mean of the change in intra-EC expor~ intensity is 
0.12 and ranges between -0.16 and 0.59. Twenty-one industries 
in our sample are assigned to LOECXD, and the rest of the 
industries where intra-EC export intensity grew more than 10% 
point between 1963 and 1978 are assigned to HIECXD = (1-
LOECXD). Thus, the interactive terms are defined as 6NCR4 * 
LOECXD and 6ECNCR4 * HIECXD. 
Other variables included in the model are 
6DEPSL = DEPSL(75)/DEPSL(63) = The depreciation-sales ratio 
(DEPSL) in 1975 divided by the ratio in 1963;~~;~ 
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R&DD = Dummy variable equal to one if the proportion of 
scientists and engineers in total employment in the 
u.s. counterpart industry is greater than its mean 
value, 1972. 
6DEPSL is included to control for changes in gross returns to 
capital included in the numerator of the price-cost margin. 
Unfortunately, the capital-sales ratio which has been used 
conventionally in previous literature is not available for the 
EC countries. R&DD is expected to control for the effect of 
long-run industry structural change or industry evolution which 
might have occurred over the period and affected intertemporal 
behavior of price-cost margins. 
Finally, for the equations in France, Italy, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, changes in the price-cost margin in West Germany 
(6PCMGER) are included to test whether industries in these four 
EC countries behave as price-takes and follow the price set by 
the West German industries. 25 In addition, this variable may 
control for other industry specific disturbances common to the 
Common Market countries. 
Our basic model to identify the effect of changes in 
concentration on changes in the price-cost margin is 
6PCM = b 0 + bl 6NCR4 * D + b 2 6ECNCR4 * (1-D) 
+ b 3 6DEPSL + b 4 R&DD + e ( 2 ) 
where e is the random error, and D is a dummy variable to 
identify industries where market intergration is not effective 
(represented by either REGD or LOECXD). In this speicifcation, 
22 
the effect of concentration varies across industries according 
to the extent of market integration represented by D. 
Statistical Results 
Table 3 presents the OLS result of equation (2) with the 
concentration variables interacted with REGD for each of the 
five EC countries. As mentioned above, 6PCMGER is added to the 
equation for France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
6ECNCR4 * (1-REG) is significant at the 5 percent level and has 
an expected positive coefficient for West Germany, France, and 
italy, while it is not significant for Belgium and the 
Netherlands. This result confirms the result of Yamawaki, 
Weiss, and Sleuwaegen (1987) that in larger EC countries the 
formation of the Common Market has affected their national 
price-cost-margins through its effect on effective 
concentration. The result in table 3 suggests that for West 
Germany, France, and Italy, the effect of EC-wide concentration 
is increasingly important in industries where the market is not 
regionally fragmented. 
On the contrary, 6NCR4 * REGD is not signifiant in all 
countrie$ except France where it is weakly significant and has 
a positive coefficient. Thus, the result again reinforces the 
above finding that EC-wide concentration is becoming a more 
important market structure after the formation of the Common 
Market. 
In table 4, the OLS regression using the concentration 
variables interacted with LOECXD and HIECXD is reported for 
larger EC countries. To capture the total effect of changing 
trade exposures, the equations in table 4 include additionally 
1 
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changes in export intensity (~WXS) and changes in import 
intensity (~WMS). For West Germany, France, and Italy, ECNCR4 
* HIECXD is significant and has a positive coefficient, 26 
implying that EC-wide concentration is increasingly important 
as a determinant of the national price-cost margin in 
industries where intra-EC export intensity rises significantly. 
~NCR4 * LOECXD is not significant in all of the three 
countries. This result is consistent with the result in table 3 
and reinforces our conclusion that, for larger EC countries 
EC-wide concentration is becoming an important structural 
variable influencing their national price-cost margins in 
industries where EC integration has been more effective. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
The main purposes of this paper were to examine the effect 
of the elimination of intra-EC tariffs on changes in national 
concentration, and to test whether EC-wide concentration is 
becoming an important structural variable in determining the 
national price-cost margin. The statistical analysis found, 
first, that the formation of the Common Market has created a 
more conc~ntrated industry structure in the national market for 
West Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. Secondly, the 
regression analysis found that EC-wide concentration rather 
than national concentration is becoming important in 
determining the national price-cost margin in industries where 
the market is geographically integrated, and the importance of 
intra-community trade has been increasing. 
Thus, the route that the removal of intra-EC tariffs has 
affected the national price-cost margin is not through 
24 
increasing national concentration but through enlarging the 
effective size of market beyond national boundaries and 
therefore enhancing the possibility that domestic firms form 
oligopolistic interdependence with foreign firms. The largest 
firms from West Germany, France, and Italy may have recognized 
mutual dependence after the creation of the Common Market. 
Thus, an important direction of future research on competition 
in the EC countries is to consider in more detail the influence 
of oligopolistic interdependence across national boundaries. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 For a description of the Common Market, see Swann (1984). 
2 See, for example, Kreinin (1974). Mayes (1978) provides a 
survey on the literature. 
3 For example, Balassa (1966) and Grubel (1967). 
4 For a detailed discussion on this hypothesis and its test 
using the US data, see Caves (1985). See also Scitovsky 
(1958) and Owen (1983). Some empirical attempts have been 
made on this aspect using the data for the European 
countries, see Owen (1983), and Muller and Owen {1985). 
5 See Swann (1984), Table 4, p. 95. the cumulative tariff 
reduction effected by July 1963 was 60%. 
6 See Caves (1985). Also see Caves and Porter (1980), and 
Geroski and Masson (1987). 
7 The 1963 Census uses the NICE classification, while the 1978 
data follow the NACE classification. However, the 
concordance between these two systems is perfect. 
8 For a detailed discussion on the estimation method, see Bain 
(1966), pp. 26-29. 
9 Concentration measured in employment may understate true 
concentration because less concentrated industries and 
smaller plants are commonly more labor-intensive than large 
plants and concentration industries. 
10 For a justification to include both the tariff and trade 
exposure variables in the model, see Caves (1985). 
11 For some evidence on the interactive effect of changes in 
the size of efficient-scale plants and industry growth on 
changes in concentration, see Caves and Porter (1980). 
12 Due to missing observations, the sample size for the 
Netherlands is 39. For the rest of the countries, the sample 
size is 47. Luxemburg is excluded from the estimation due to 
missing data. Thus, Luxemburg is totally omitted from the 
analysis in this paper. 
13 Caves (1985) finds, for the United States, a similar 
concentration increasing effect of tariff reductions in the 
1958-77 period. He shows simultaneously that these tariff 
reductions are related to a decrease in the number of 
plants. 
·14 Pelkmans (1984, pp. 244-245) puts it: " ••• at present the EC 
has several thousands of Member-State-Specific textile and 
clothing quotas, rendering the internal "free customs union" 
in this sector ridiculous, ••.. " 
26 
15 On this point, see Yamawaki, Weiss and Sleuwaegen (1987). 
16 Unpublished data prepared by the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities were used for 1978. 
17 It is true that British firms may be among the four leaders 
in the EC. But in most cases that will not change concen-
tration much because the British firm is likely to be dis-
placing a continental firm with only a bit smaller size. 
18 Employment of Luxembourg is not included in the denominators 
for both 1963 and 1978. 
19 The exception is a study by Auquier (1977). 
20 For example, see Pelkmans (1984) and Franko (1976), ch.6. 
21 Some preliminary result based on this approach is reported 
in Yamawaki, Weiss, and Sleuwaegen (1987). 
22 For a previous study on the determinants of changes in 
price-cost margins, see Cowling and Waterson (1976). 
23 These include clay products (NACE 241), concrete and cement 
products (243), meat products (412), dairy products (413), 
bakery products (19), brewing (427), soft drinks (428), and 
printing (473). The choice was made based on Weiss (1972), 
Appendix, and Schwartzman and Bodoff (1971), Table II. Meat 
products and brewing industries are included to take into 
account the characteristics in the EEC countries. 
24 For France, even data on depreciation are not obtainable. We 
therefore used the ratio of gross investment to sales 
averaged over a five-year period for France. 
25 For detailed discussions on the hypothesis, see Yamawaki, 
Weiss, and Sleuwaegen (1987). Kervyn (1979) observes that 
West German manufacturing industry acts as a price leader. 
For an approach using the rival country's PCM in explaining 
the national PCM, see Yamawaki (1986). 
26 For Belgium and the Netherlands, 6ECNCR4 * HIECXD was not 
significant. 6DEPSL was eliminated from the specification in 
table 4 to save the degree of freedom after the variable was 
found to be insignificant for West Germany, France, and 
Italy. 
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable west Germany 
(N = 47) 
flNGR4 0.041 
(0.072) 
Al:.NCR4 0.278 
(0.494) 
l£CNCR4 -0.004 
(0.074) 
APCM 0.271 
(0.084) 
llDEPSL 1.091 
(0.346) 
AWXS 0.112 
(0.107) 
llWMS 0.122 
(0.130) 
llTARIFF 0.084 
(0.037) 
llLEMP -0.389 
(0.436) 
llLPS 0.063 
(0.436) 
France 
(N = 47) 
0.082 
(0.134) 
0.397 
(0.535) 
-0.039 
(0.093) 
0.327 
(0.105) 
1.216 
(0.588} 
0.136 
(0.188) 
0.139 
(0.181) 
0.221 
(0.078) 
-0.186 
(0.602) 
0.210 
(0.256) 
Italy 
(N = 47) 
0.063 
(0.096) 
0.359 
(0.566) 
-0.035 
(0.108) 
0.265 
(0.082) 
0.961 
(0.502) 
0.189 
(0.378) 
-0.138 
(1.129) 
0.185 
(0.076) 
-0.162 
(0. 728) 
0.019 
(0. 260) 
Belgium 
(N = 47) 
0.052 
(0.148) 
0.188 
(0.404) 
-0.181 
(0.172) 
0.295 
(0.185) 
0.979 
(0.486) 
-0.034 
(1.575) 
0.011 
(1.242) 
0.127 
(0.089) 
-0.216 
(0.475) 
-0.080 
(0.400) 
The Netherlands 
(* N = 30) 
(** : N = 39) 
0.041* 
(0.136) 
0.127** 
(0.422) 
-0.148* 
(0.185) 
0.207* 
(0.099) 
1.140* 
(0.650) 
0.213* 
(0.407) 
0.168* 
(0.246) 
0.054** 
(0.015) 
-0.404** 
(0.607) 
-0.124** 
(0.373) 
Notes: Entries show means and standard deviations in parentheses. 
llDEPSL for France is not comparable with that for other countries 
due to the difference in the definitions. 
The operator L is used to indicate a variable expressed in the 
logarithm. 
Table 2-A: Regression Equations Explaining Changes in Concentration for 1963-78 
(6LNCR4) for West Germany (N = 47) 
Restriction on the trade 
Independent No restriction on the coefficient exposure coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LNCR4 (63) -0.294 -0.338 -0.239 -0.287 -0.239 -0.287 
(3.04) (3.57) (2.41) (2.87) (2.44) (2.91) 
6LEMP -0.473 -0.486 -0.611 -0.596 -0.610 -0.592 
(3.21) (3.45) (3.76) (3.77) (3.84) (3.83) 
6LPS 0.199 0.209 0.175 0.184 0.178 0.191 
(1.48) ( 1. 63) ( 1. 28) (1.38) (1.37) (1.51) 
6WXS -0.546 -0.364 -0.592 -0.468 
(0.83) (0.56) (1. 94) (1.54) 
6WMS -0.637 -0.571 -0.592 -0.468 
(0.96) (0.89) (1.94) (1.54) 
6TARIFF 4.506 3.805 3.783 
(2.17) (1. 79) (1.81) 
CD 0.161 -0.002 0.193 0.051 0.191 0.048 
( 1.12) (0.01) (1.34) (0.32) (1.36) (0.30) 
Dl 0.547 0.390 0.458 0.351 0.453 0.340 
(1. 31) (0.96) ( 1.10) (0.86) (1.12) (0.85) 
02 0.368 0.568 0.301 0.483 o. 302 0.483 
( 1. 80) (2.63) (1.48) (2.18) (1.50) (2.20) 
03 o. 203 0.265 0.153 0.214 0.155 0.217 
(1.18) (1.59) ( 0. 90) (1. 27) (0.92) (1. 30) 
Constant -0.672 -1.114 -0.457 -0.876 -0.457 -0.873 
(2.64) (3.51) (1.67) ( 2. 48) (1.69) (2 .50) 
R2 0.47 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.53 
F 6.87 7.18 5.98 6.02 6.91 6.87 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Significance levels for one-tailed t(40) are 
1 percent = 2.42, 5 percent = 1.68, and 10 percent = 1.30. 
Table 2-B: Regression Equations Explaining Changes in Concentration for 1963-78 
(~LNCR4) for France (Full Sample: N • 47) 
Restriction on the trade 
Independent No restriction on the coefficient exposure coefficients 
variables l 2 3 4 5 6 
LNCR4 (63) -0.307 -0.309 -0.278 -0.277 -0.277 -0.277 
(3.66) (3.73) ( 3. 33) (3.40) (3.26) (3.31) 
~LEMP -0.240 -0.236 -0.446 -0.464 -0.415 -0.425 
(2.15) (2.14) (2.91) (3.10) (2.63) (2.74) 
~LPS 0.468 0.503 0.395 0.427 0.417 0.451 
(1.67) (1.80) (1.43) (1. 58) (1.50) (1.65) 
~WXS 0.744 0.730 -0.368 -0.397 
(0. 71) (0.72) (1.54) (1.69) 
~WMS -1.663 -1.751 -0.368 -0.397 
(1.53) (1.66) (1.54) (1.69) 
~TARIFF 1.353 1.608 1.482 
(1. 39) (1. 72) (1.56) 
CD 0.137 0.158 0.205 0.160 0.216 0.174 
(1.10) (0.88) (1.17) (0.93) (1.23) (0.39) 
Dl 0.329 0.575 0.270 0.551 0.256 0.518 
(0.67) (1.11) (0.56) (1.11) (0.52) (1. 02) 
D2 0.046 0.073 0.009 0.040 0.037 0.067 
(0.18) (0. 29) (0.04) (0.17) (0.15) (0.27) 
03 0.142 0.054 0.090 -0.012 0.187 0.095 
(0.69) (0.25) (0.42) (0.06) (0.91) (0.45) 
Constant -0.445 -0.718 -0.273 -0.581 -0.337 -0.627 
( l. 52) ( 2. 06) (0.92) (1. 71) (1.14) (1.82) 
R2 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.43 
F 5.12 4.83 4. 74 4.79 4.93 4.82 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Significance levels for one-tailed t (40) are 
1 percent = 2.42, 5 percent = 1.68, and 10 percent = 1.30. 
Table 2-C: Regression Equations Explaining Changes in Concentration for 
1963-78 (~CR4) for France (excluding textiles and clothing 
industries: N = 43) 
Restriction on the trade 
Independent No restriction on the coefficient exposure coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LNCR4 (63) -0.308 -0.337 -0.278 -0.310 -0.265 -0.292 
(3.49) (4.10) (3.03) (3.85) (2.96) (3.57) 
liLEMP -0.313 -0.314 -0.498 -0.512 -0.498 -0.512 
(2.93) (3.18) (3.28) (3.88) (3.32) (3.76) 
liLPS 0.278 0.315 0.245 0.274 0.221 0.255 
(1. 02) ( 1. 25) (0.90) (1.15) (0.83) (1.05) 
liWXS 0.812 0.869 -0.382 -0.409 
(0.81) (0.99) (1.71) (2.02) 
JlWMS -1.669 -1.777 -0.382 -0.409 
(1. 54) ( 1. 93) (1. 71) (2.02) 
liTARIFF 2.383 2.558 2.462 
(2.67) (3.03) (2.87) 
CD 0.324 0.312 0.305 0.299 0.329 0.317 
(1.82) (1. 90) ( 1. 69) ( 1. 93) (1. 90) (2.01) 
Dl 0.296 o. 778 0.246 0.765 0.195 0.687 
(0.63) ( 1. 66) (0.53) (1. 72) (0.42) (1. 53) 
D2 0.051 0.134 0.012 0.101 0.028 0.112 
(0.21) (0.60) (0.05) (0.48) (0.12) (0.52) 
D3 0.071 -0.070 0.025 -0.131 0.107 -0.036 
(0.36) (0.37) (0.12) (0.69) (0.55) (0.20) 
Constant -0.389 -0.929 -0.230 -0.802 -0.247 -0.795 
(1. 31) (2.73) (0.75) (2.46) (0.82) (2.39) 
-R2 0.46 0.54 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.58 
F 6.12 7.18 5.32 7.10 6.02 7.41 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Significance levels for one-tailed t ( 30) are 
1 percent = 2.46, 5 percent = 1. 70, and 10 percent = 1.31. 
· Table 2-D: Regression Equations Explaining Changes in Concentration for 1963-78 
( ALNCR4) for Italy (N = 4 7) 
Restriction on the trade 
Independent No restriction on the coefficient exposure coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LNCR4 (63) -0.266 -0.304 -0.313 -0.340 -0.307 -0.334 
(2.74) (3.04) (3.38) (3.58) (3.28) (3.47) 
t:.LEMP -0.320 -0.290 -0.455 -0.424 -0.423 -0.392 
(2.32) (2.09) (3.32) (3.05) (3.08) (2.81) 
t:.LPS 0.649 0.635 0.602 0.594 0.603 0.595 
(2.02) (2.00) (2.00) ( 1. 99) (1.98) (1.96) 
t:.WXS -0.984 -o. 971 -0.303 -0.284 
( 1. 99) (1.97) (2.39) (2.22) 
t:.WMS 0.253 0.278 -0.303 -0.284 
(0.62) (0.68) (2.39) (2.22) 
!:.TARIFF 1.359 1.086 1.070 
(1. 37) (1.15) (1.12) 
CD 0.206 0.122 o. 317 0.244 0.296 0.224 
(1. 09) (0.62) ( 1. 75) (1. 28) (1.61)' (1.16) 
Ol -0.248 -0.276 -0.288 -0.313 -0.212 -0.237 
(0. 49) (0.55) (0.60) (0.66) (0.44) (0.49) 
02 0.097 0.098 0.286 0.285 0.149 0.146 
(0.39) (0.40) ( 1.14) (1.14) (0.63) (0.62) 
03 0.219 0.214 0.351 0.347 0.237 0.232 
(1.05) (1.03) (1.66) (1.65) (1.20) (1.18) 
Constant -0.422 -0.703 -0.508 -a. 729 -0.478 -0.696 
(1.59) (2.11) (2.04) (2.33) (1.90) (2.19) 
R2 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45 
F 5.00 4. 71 5.35 4.99 5.62 5.17 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Significance levels for one-tailed t (40) are 
1 percent= 2.42, 5 percent = 1.68, and 10 percent = 1.30. 
Table 2~E: Regression Equations Explaining Changes in Concentration for 1963-78 
(ALNCR4) for Belgium (N = 47) 
Restriction on the trade 
Independent No restriction on the coefficient exposure coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LNCR4 (63) -0.330 -0.351 -0.289 -0.304 -0.356 -0.311 
(4.02) (4.38) (3.50) (3.77) (4.37) (4.65) 
t. LEMP -0.111 -0.195 -0.186 -0.201 -0.215 -0.230 
(1.35) ( 1. 58) (1.55) (1. 11) (1. 11) (1.87) 
t. LPS 0.125 0.180 0.187 0.226 0.184 0.224 
( 0. 93) (1.35) (1.46) (1. 79) (1. 35) (1.67) 
t. wxs -0.929 -0.901 -0.151 -0.131 
(2.62) (2.61) (1.74) (1.53) 
t. WMS 0.624 0.638 -0.151 -0.131 
(1.77) (1.86) ( 1. 74) (1.53) 
t. TARIFF 1.202 1.045 1.072 
(1. 93) (1. 79) (1. 74) 
CD 0.333 0.299 0.409 0.375 0.352 0.319 
(2.66) (2.44) (3.44) (3.21) (2.88) (2.64) 
Dl 0.539 0.365 0.435 0.294 0.470 0.324 
(1. 30) (0.89) ( 1.13) (0. 77) (1.16) (0.80) 
D2 o. 377 0.446 0.311 0.312 o. 371 0.433 
(2.06) (2.47) ( 1. 81) (2.18) (2.08) (2.44) 
D3 0.455 0.510 0.482 0.531 0.445 0.496 
(3.10) (3.52) (3.51) (3.90) (3.11) (3.48) 
Constant -0.590 -0.780 -0.522 -0.690 -0.575 -0.141 
(3.45) (4.05) (3.26) (3.80) (3.44) (3.92) 
R2 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.36 0.39 
F 4.20 4.40 4. 71 4.87 4.25 4.31 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Significance levels for one-tailed t (40) are 
1 percent = 2.42, 5 percent = 1.68, and 10 percent = 1.30. 
Table 2-F: Regression Equations Explaining Changes in Concentration for 1963-78 
(6LNCR4) for the Netherlands (N = 39) 
Restriction on the trade 
Independent No restriction on the coefficient exposure coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LNCR4 (63) ... 0.314 -0.330 -0.290 -0.298 -0.283 -0.292 
(3.25) (3.17) (2.79) (2.85) (2.79) (2.86) 
6LEMP -0.181 -0.207 -0.352 -0.359 -0.351 -0.358 
(1.67) (1.84) (2.58) (2.62) (2.61) (2.65) 
6LPS 0.566 0.694 0.578 0.663 0.582 0.670 
(2.90) (3.08) (2.90) ( 3. 00) (2.96) (3.09) 
6WXS -0.149 -0.154 -0.297 -0.274 
(0.46) (0.47) (2.05) (1.86) 
6WMS -0.484 -0.428 -0.297 
-0.274 
(1. 22) ( 1. 06) (2.05) (1.86) 
6TARIFF -5.712 -4.159 
-4.354 
(1. 22) (0.90) (0.96) 
CD 0.122 0.134 0.091 0.102 0.077 0.091 
(0.83) (0.89) (0.60) (0.67) {0.53) (0.62) 
01 0.769 0.928 0.893 0.978 0.844 0.942 
(1.68) (1.91) ( 1. 90) (2.03) (1.86) (2.02) 
02 0.087 0.044 0.003 -0.023 o.ooo -0.026 
(0.44) (0.21) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.13) 
03 0.108 0.213 0.138 0.207 0.132 0.206 
(0.65) ( 1.14) (0.84) ( 1.13) (0.82) (1.15) 
Constant -0.413 -0.156 -0.310 -0.121 -0.299 -0.104 
(2.15) (0.52) (1,50) (0.41) (1.48) (0.36) 
R2 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 
F 3.58 3.19 3.31 3.04 3. 79 3.46 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Significance levels for one-tailed t ( 30) are 
1 percent = 2.46, 5 percent = 1. 70, and 10 percent = 1.31. 
Table 3 Regression Equations Explaining Changes in Price-Cost Margins (6PCM) with Changes in Concentrations Adjusted 
for Geographic Extent of Market. 
Country 
West Germany 
(N = 47) 
France 
(N = 47) 
Italy 
(N = 47) 
Belgium 
(N = 4 7) 
·The Netherlands 
(N = 30) 
Equation 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
I n d e p e n d e n t V a r i a b 1 e 
LlNCR4*REGD 
-0.036 
(0.121) 
-0.043 
(0.151) 
0.239 
(1.327)c 
0.241 
(1.357)c 
-0.244 
(1.216) 
-0.026 
(1.162) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.081 
(0.140) 
0.264 
(0.830) 
0.251 
(0.715) 
LlECNCR4 
*(1-REGD) 
0.429 
(2.240)b 
0.419 
(2.506)a 
0.282 
(l.693)b 
0.279 
(l.732)b 
0.276 
(2.262)b 
0.273 
(2.262)b 
0.152 
(0.895) 
0.172 
(1.025) 
-0.121 
(1.191) 
-0.122 
(1.085) 
Ll DEPSL 
-0.004 
(0.108) 
-0.003 
(0.092) 
0.010 
(0.421) 
-0.046 
(0.802) 
0.067 
(2.528)a 
R&DD 
-0.056 
(2.16l)bb 
-0.057 
(2.32l)bb 
0.040 
(1.111) 
0.041 
(1.235) 
0.043 
(1.603) 
0.044 
(1.697) cc 
0.134 
(2.080)bb 
0.124 
(1.97l)cc 
-0.046 
(1.073) 
-0.032 
(0.684) 
LlPCMGER 
0.481 
(2.605)a 
0.480 
(2.634)a 
0.282 
(1.927)b 
0.288 
(2.002)b 
0.803 
(2.245)b 
0.739 b 
(2.128) 
0.286 
(1.309) 
0.195 
(0.821) 
Constant 
0.299 
(7.116)a 
0.295 
(20.69)a 
0.192 
(2.824)a 
0.188 
(3.342)a 
0.178 
(3.729)a 
0.184 
(4.139)a 
0.106 
(0.904) 
0.086 
(0.754) 
0.048 
(0.588) 
0.145 
(1.830)b 
-2 R 
F 
0.177b 
3.480 
0.196 
4.745a 
0.146b 
2.574 
0.166b 
3.293 
0.143b 
2.532 
O.l60b 
3.183 
0.071 
1.698 
0.078 
1.978 
0.187 
2.333c 
0.012 
1.086 
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Levels of significance in one-tailed tests are: a = 1 per~ent, b = 5 percent, and 
c = 10 percent. A two-tailed test is applied to the coefficient on R&DD, and its significance level is designated 
by double superscripts. 
• 
.. 
Table 4: Regression Equations Explaining Change in Price-Cost 
Margins (6PCM) with Changes in Concentrations Adjusted 
for Changes in the Extent of Intra-EEC Exports 
Independent West Germany France Italy 
Variable (1) ( 2) ( 3) 
6NCR4*LOECXD 0.128 0.164 -0.067 
(0.626) (0.971) (0.390) 
6ECNCR4*HIECXD 0.555 
(2.400)b 
0.352 
(1.510)c 
0.421 
(2.766)a 
AWXS 0.257 -0.063 -0.030 
(1.995)b (0.238) (0.922) 
t. WMS -0.044 -0.043 0.005 
(0.405) (0.172) (0.445) 
R&DD -0.055 0.040 0.063 (2.299)bb (0.961) (2.309)bb 
APCMGER 0.482 (2.398)b 
0.298 
(2.016)b 
Constant 0.262 
(14.18)a 
0.198 
(3.142)a 
0.178 
(4.026)a 
;2 0.244 0.113 0.164 
F 3.965a 1.975c 2.503b 
N 47 47 47 
Notes: t-values are in p~rentheses. 
Levels of significance in one-tailed tests are: 
a = 1 percent, b = 5 percent, and c = 10 percent. 
A two-tailed test is applied to the coefficient on 
R&D; and its significance level is designated by 
double superscripts. 
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APPENDIX 
$election of Samples and sources of Data 
Selection of Samples 
The classification of industries used in this study is la 
Nomenclature generale des activites economiques dans les 
Communautes Europeennes (N.A.C.E.) This classification has its 
origin in la Nomenclature des industries etablies dans les 
Communautes Europeennes (N.I.C.E.). The first common market 
census publishes in 1969 refers to the year 1963 and uses the 
NICE industry classification system. However, industry 
statistics publishes in later years follow the NACE 
classification system. In our analysis we used the NACE 
classification system as a reference system. Industries from 
other data sources (Input-Output tables of the EEC countries, 
trade statistics and the U.S. statistics) were therefore 
matched to the NACE industries. The level of aggregation used 
in this study is the NACE 3-digit level. 
Industries used in this study were selected on the basis of 
information contained in the 1978 employment-size distribution 
tables of the five countries, which were kindly made available 
by the Statistical Office of the European Communities in 
Luxemburg. The forty-seven industries were thus selected for 
the analysis. 
Sources of Data 
Price-cost margins, national concentration, EEC 
concentration, total employment, and value of total production 
for 1963: 
Offic~ Statistique des Communautes Europeennes, Etudes et 
enquetes statistiques 2 (Luxemburg: Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (S.O.E.C.), 1969). 
Price-cost margins, total employment, and value of total 
A-2 
production, for 1978: 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, Structure 
and Activity of Industry 1978 (Luxemburg: s.o.E.C., 1983). 
The average annual growth ratio in value of production over 
1976-78 was constructed from Structure and Activity of 
Industry, various years. The growth ratio over 1959-65 and the 
ratio of depreciation to value of total output were computed 
from the input-output tables of individual countries: 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, Input -
Output Table (Luxemburg: S.O.E.C.). 
The 1978 national concentration for Belgium, France, Italy 
and West Germany was estimated from the unpublished data on the 
employment-size classes of enterprises. This information was 
made available by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities in Luxemburg. National concentration for the 
Netherlands was provided by Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
in Voorburg. The number of employees accounted for by the 
largest four firms in the Netherlands was obtained by dividing 
the four-firm concentration by total employment. The 1978 EEC 
concentration is estimated based on the same data base. 
Imports and exports for individual countries for 1963 were 
obtained from: 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, Foreign 
Trade Statistics: Analytical Tables - Imports (Luxemburg: 
S.O.E.C., 1964). 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, Foreign 
Trade Statistics: Analytical Tables - Exports (Luxemburg: 
S.O.E.C., 1964). 
The SITC 4-digit classification used there was converted to 
the NACE 3-digit classification. Imports and exports for 1978 
were obtained from: 
i 
-. 
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Statistical Office of the European Communities, Statistique 
du commerce exterieur (Luxemburg: s.o.E.C.). 
This information was read from the microfiches coded SCE 2911, 
NACE-CLIO. For the smaller countries, there were cases where 
trade intensities exceeded one. In such cases, we constrained 
the value to one. These were NACE 315 (1963), 451, 453, 491 for 
Italy, NACE 491 for Belgium, and NACE 140, 224, and 467 for the 
Netherlands. 
Average plant size for 1978 and 1966 was constructed from: 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, Structure of 
Earnings: Principal Results 1978/1979, vols. 2, 4, 6, 7, and 
8 (Luxemburg: S.O.E.C. 1984)~ and 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, Social 
Statistics (Special Series): Survey on the Structure and 
Distribution of Wages, 1966, vols. 1-8 (Luxemburg: S.O.E.C., 
1970). 
Average plant size is measured as the average production 
workers per establishment. For some industries only information 
at a more aggregated level of industry classification was 
available. 
Import duties for intra-EC traded goods were taken from the 
harmonized 1959 Input-Output tables for EC member states. For 
some"industries this variable was also available only at a more 
aggregate level of industrial classification. 
The number of scientists and engineers as a proportion of 
total employment in the u.s. counterpart industry was obtained 
from: 
National Science Foundation, Research and Development in 
Industry, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing 
Office, 1973). 
